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BANKING REGULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
Benjamin Golden 
The North American banking system has 
been in existence for over 200 years. During 
this time it has evolved from a fledgling indus-
try supporting an agrarian society into a sophis-
tical system of financial services meeting the 
world's capital requirements. 
This evolution was not a uniform process. 
The banking systems of the United States and 
Canada are products of each country's unique 
history. The United States' historical emphasis 
on the rights of the states and the protection of 
individuals from corporate abuse has produced 
a decentralized system in which thousands of 
individual banks operate under significant reg-
ulation of both form and function. The impor-
tance of Canada 's federal identity and its 
ever-present provincial disputes created an 
entirely different system whose foundation lies 
in large national banks operating in a less 
restrictive regulatory environment. 
Yet, despite these obvious and drastic dif-
ferences , there are several similarities in the 
two systems. Both banking systems have been 
forced to react to similar business cycles and 
economic factors . The primary activities of 
banks in each country are equivalent. Finally, 
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in recent years both systems have undergone 
considerable deregulation in an effort to remain 
competitive in a global environment. 
In this article, I compare the banking sys-
tems of the United States and Canada, focusing 
on three principal areas. First, I discuss the his-
torical development of the regulatory environ-
ment governing each system. I then examine 
the current unique deregulation process occur-
ring in each country. Finally, I evaluate the rel-
ative performance and success of the American 
and Canadian banking systems. 
The Central Banks 
In analyzing the regulatory structures of 
the Canadian and American banking systems, 
it is first necessary to examine the nature and 
structure of the central banking authority in 
each country. 
United States 
The central banking authority in the 
United States is a coordinated group of finan-
cial agencies called the Federal Reserve System. 
The Federal Reserve System was adopted in 
1913 in reaction to the widespread bank clo-
sures resulting from the panic of 1907. The sys-
tem was organized to blend both private and 
public authority through a mixture of central-
ized and decentralized policies. (Boreham, "The 
Central Banks," p. 28) 
The Federal Reserve System is unique 
among the major central banks of the world. 
Unlike its counterparts, the Fed is structurally 
decentralized and geographically scattered 
throughout the country. It is made up of 12 
Federal Reserve Banks regionally distributed 
throughout the United States. The Fed is pri-
vately owned by the member banks of the 
Federal Reserve System. (Boreham, "The 
Central Banks," p. 29) While the central banks 
in other countries deal with all the commercial 
banks in their respective countries, the Federal 
Reserve System includes approximately 40 per-
cent of the commercial banks in the United 
States. (Boreham "The Central Banks," p. 30) 
The Federal Reserve System is organized 
around four main agencies: The Federal Reserve 
Banks; The Federal Open Market Committee; 
The Board of Governors; and the member banks 
of the Federal Reserve System. The 12 Federal 
Reserve banks are geographically dispersed 
throughout the United States. Each bank is pri-
vately owned by the member banks in its dis-
trict. The Federal Reserve banks have several 
primary responsibilities. The banks are empow-
ered to loan emergency funds to depository 
institutions in their districts. Each Federal 
Reserve bank is responsible for the examination 
and supervision of state member banks in its 
district. Finally, the Fed banks must act as the 
guardian for the ultimate reserves of all depos-
itory institutions and to ensure the efficient 
transfer of these funds between Federal Reserve 
banks. (Boreham, "The Central Banks," p. 30) 
The Federal Open Market Committee has 
emerged as the effective decision making body 
for the Federal Reserve System. This commit-
tee meets between 10 and 12 times per year to 
make general decisions on the course of mon-
etary policy. These policy decisions are enact-
ed through open market operations, in which 
the Federal Reserve buys or sells securities on 
the open market in order to increase or 
decrease the existing money supply. (Moore, p. 
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70) The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is 
responsible for conducting the Fed's open mar-
ket operations through daily purchases and 
sales of Treasury securities. (Boreham, "The 
Central Banks," p. 29) 
The Board of Governors, located in 
Washington, D.C., is the central controlling 
body of the Federal Reserve System. The Board 
has several primary duties: 1) contributing to 
the creation of monetary policy; 2) approving 
the discount rates established by regional 
Federal Reserve Banks on a biweekly basis; 3) 
setting reserve requirements for all depository 
institutions; and 4) regulating certain member 
bank operations. (Boreham, "The Central 
Banks," p. 29) 
The member banks of the Federal Reserve 
System comprise two principal groups. Every 
national bank is required to join the Federal 
Reserve System. State chartered commercial 
banks may join, provided they are willing to meet 
certain regulatory requirements. Historically, the 
Federal Reserve System has included only about 
40 percent of all commercial banks. However, 
these banks were responsible for holding 75 per-
cent of all commercial bank deposits. (Boreham, 
"The Central Banks," p. 30) 
Canada 
The Canadian central banking authority is 
the Bank of Canada. It was created in 1934, by 
an Act of Parliament, in response to the finan-
cial devastation of the Great Depression. The 
Bank of Canada was originally privately owned, 
although amendments to the Bank of Canada 
Act in 1936 and 1938 transferred ownership to 
the Canadian state. (Boreham, "The Central 
Banks," p. 28) 
As opposed to the Fed, the Bank of Canada 
is a single entity located in Ottawa. To conduct 
more efficient operations, it has established six 
regionally located branches. The Bank of 
Canada is responsible for the supervision of 
Canada's six nationally chartered Schedule I 
banks and 59 Schedule II banks. Schedule I 
banks are those Canadian banks permitted to 
engage in a full range of banking activities. 
They must be widely held and cannot be under 
foreign control. Schedule II banks are limited 
in the activities they may engage in, but they 
may be closely held and possess significant for-
eign ownership. (Jordan, p. 10) There are six 
principal instruments of control used by the 
Bank of Canada to implement its policy deci-
sions. The Bank of Canada utilizes open mar-
ket operations, transfers of government funds, 
swap transactions with the Exchange Fund 
Account, advance policy, changes in secondary 
reserve requirements, and moral suasion. 
(Boreham, "The Central Banks," p. 32) It 
should be noted that the Bank of Canada relies 
on open market operations to a much lesser 
extent than the Fed, and utilizes them only 
when it desires an immediate impact on inter-
est rates. (Boreham, "The Central Banks," p. 33) 
Regulation of Commercial Banking 
The regulation of financial institutions has 
been in existence nearly as long as the financial 
institutions themselves. Throughout history, 
the primary purpose of the regulation of finan-
cial institutions has been "to set forth measures 
that would induce institutions to carry out their 
fiduciary responsibilities." (Kaufman, p. 147) 
Regulation is traditionally practiced in two 
ways: the regulation of form and the regulation 
of function. The regulation of form restricts 
the structure and size of banks, while functional 
regulation restricts the financial areas in which 
a bank may practice. 
United States 
There are two laws which have had pro-
found effects on the structure of the American 
commercial banking system. These efforts were 
enacted to regulate both the form and function 
of American banking. 
The McFadden Act was passed in 1927 to 
regulate the blossoming banking industry. This 
act imposed structural restrictions on federal-
ly chartered banks. It states that federally char-
tered banks are prohibited from branching 
across state lines and are further restricted by 
the branching regulations of their home state. 
(Guttmann, "Changing ofthe Guard ... ," p. 159) 
In 1992, fewer than half of the states partici-
pated in full interstate banking. (Reed, p. 4) 
It must be noted that the banking indus-
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try has attempted to skirt the restrictions 
imposed by the McFadden Act by forming bank 
holding companies as allowed by the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956. These attempts 
flourished in the 1980s with the creation of lim-
ited-service banks. These banks offer all the 
services of normal commercial banks, but are 
prohibited from offering both demand deposits 
and commercial lending services. They there-
fore are not restricted by the Bank Holding 
Company Act's definition of banking and are 
permitted to branch nationwide. The creation 
of new limited-service banks was banned in 
1987 by Congress. The previously existing 170 
LSBs were permitted to expand at seven percent 
per year. (Guttmann, p. 159) 
The Glass-Steagal Act was instituted in 
1933. It created restrictions for services avail-
able from commercial banks. The Glass-Steagal 
Act established that commercial banks were 
prohibited from underwriting or trading cor-
porate stocks and bonds in the United States. 
(Guttmann, p. 9) This act also created the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which 
insured bank depositors from losses due to bank 
insolvency. (Guttmann, p. 7) The original 
amount of insurance was $5,000 per depositor. 
This amount has undergone several increases 
to its current amount of $100,000 per deposi-
tor. (Guttmann, p. 7) 
There are several other regulatory initia-
tives worth noting. These measures were insti-
tuted to ensure safer banking and promote 
increased competitiveness in the banking 
industry. The first group of initiatives includes 
Fed Regulations G,U,T, and X. These regula-
tions were designed to restrict the distribution 
of credit by instituting margin requirements. 
(Guttmann, p. 157) Regulation Q imposed rate 
ceilings on deposits at commercial banks. 
(Guttmann, p. 157) This measure, since phased 
out, sought to pacify the intense competition 
between financial institutions for deposits 
which encouraged banks to assume undue 
risks. (Guttmann, p. 158) 
Canada 
Commercial bank regulation in Canada 
was a unique process. In response to the finan-
cial devastation of the Great Depression, the 
Parliament produced a series of Bank Acts dur-
ing the 1930s. These acts were designed to 
restrict the functions of Canada's financial 
intermediaries and preserve the integrity of the 
Canadian financial market. This flurry of leg-
islation created the four pillars financial frame-
work which provided for separation between the 
main financial functions and between financial 
and nonfinancial activities. (Economic Council 
of Canada, p. 44) This framework created strict 
divisions between Canada's commercial bank-
ing, trust, securities dealing, and insurance 
industries. The securities industry was exclu-
sively regulated by provincial governments, 
while the remaining three were primarily fed-
erally regulated. (Jordan, p. 9) Under this plan, 
banks primarily collected short-term funds 
through demand deposits and provided loans to 
businesses for the financing of inventories and 
accounts receivable. Trust companies were 
responsible for the maintenance and manage-
ment of estate, trust, and pension funds. 
Insurance brokerages supplied both commer-
cial and personal insurance policies. 
Investment dealers were involved in the trad-
ing and underwriting of corporate securities. 
(Economic Council of Canada, p. 44)) 
The Bank Act is subject to revision every 
ten years. (Jordan, p. 11) These revisions have 
provided important regulatory initiatives for the 
Canadian banking system. The 1954 revision of 
the Bank Act was responsible for establishing 
reserve requirements under the control of the 
Bank of Canada. This revision also increased 
the required reserve ratio and altered its com-
putation to a monthly basis. (O'Brien, p. 187) 
The 1967 revision of the Bank Act estab-
lished several provisions. The act created 
required secondary reserve requirements to be 
supervised by the Bank of Canada. (O'Brien, p. 
194) These reserves represent excess reserves 
held in addition to primary reserves based on a 
percentage of asset holdings. The act also 
removed the interest rate limit imposed on 
deposits at commercial banks. (O'Brien, p. 193) 
By removing this rate ceiling, regulators sought 
to improve the competitiveness of commercial 
banks in acquiring consumer savings. The 1967 
revision also created the Canadian Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, which would insure 
deposits up to a $20,000 limit. (O'Brien, p. 192) 
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This amount has subsequently been increased 
to $60,000 per depositor. 
The Bank Act Revision of 1980 imposed 
ownership restrictions for Schedule I and 
Schedule II banks. Nationally chartered 
Schedule I banks are permitted to engage in the 
full range of financial activities. The act 
requires these banks to be widely held with no 
one interest greater than ten percent. (The 
Canadian Bankers' Association, p. 2) Schedule 
II banks are closely held Canadian banks or 
banks with significant foreign ownership. 
These banks are restricted in their abilities to 
branch and with respect to their size, through 
ceilings on the percentage of domestic banking 
assets that can be owned by Schedule II banks. 
(Jordan, p. 10) 
Deregulation 
The process of regulating financial insti-
tutions in the United States and Canada was a 
reaction to the financial trauma of the Great 
Depression. This process continued for nearly 
forty years in an effort to preserve the integri-
ty of banking systems. Yet as both countries 
entered the 1980s, several factors began to 
reverse this trend of regulation. 
First, intense inflationary pressures dur-
ing the late 1970s led borrowers and lenders 
alike to avoid long term commitments. 
Commercial banks sought to overcome this 
deficiency through innovation and by focusing 
on expanding fee-based services rather than 
relying on interest -derived income. (Economic 
Council of Canada, p. 46) 
Technological change also drove the 
process of deregulation. The creation of auto-
matic teller machines and electronic fund trans-
fers has led to de facto branch banking. Improved 
communications systems have provided more 
efficient flows of information, allowing better 
timing and reduced costs of transactions. 
The increasing internationalization of 
financial markets has also produced deregulato-
ry pressures. In an effort to remain globally com-
petitive, banks must constantly innovate to 
remain profitable. The increased pace of dereg-
ulation in the European community has forced 
both the United States and Canada to reassess 
their regulatory efforts in the context of global 
profitability. (Economic Council of Canada, p. 48) 
United States 
The regulatory structure of the United 
States has always been the subject of sharp crit-
icism. As one critic states, "The regulatory 
structure erected 50 years ago has been adapt-
ed through piecemeal changes wrought by leg-
islated amendments, court interpretations, and 
regulatory rulings. The result has been 
described as an 'archaic and disorderly drift'." 
(England, 1991, p. 4) In response to these crit-
icisms two pieces of legislation were passed dur-
ing the 1980s which have been hailed as the 
most significant banking bills since the 1930s. 
The Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) was 
passed in 1980. This legislation was designed 
to create a level playing field for competition 
between the various types of depository insti-
tutions in the United States. This law contained 
six major provisions: 
1. It created uniform legal reserve require-
ments on similar classes of reservable liabilities 
at all depository institutions, regardless of mem-
bership in the Federal Reserve System. 
2.1t removed interest rate ceilings on time 
and savings deposits by phasing out Fed 
Regulation Q. This was to be accomplished over 
a period of six years. 
3. The DIDMCA authorized depository 
institutions to offer negotiable order of with-
drawal accounts. These NOW accounts are, in 
effect, interest bearing checking accounts pre-
viously banned in 1933. 
4. The legislation allowed thrift institutions 
to engage in commercial lending activities. 
5. It gave all depository institutions with 
checkable accounts equal access to the tempo-
rary borrowing facilities of the Federal Reserve 
System. 
6. Finally, the DIDMCA raised the govern-
ment deposit insurance coverage from $40,000 
to $100,000 per depositor at federally insured 
institutions. (Bareham, "No Natural Separa-
tion," p. 21) 
The Garn-St. Germain Act, passed in 1982, 
continued the deregulation of depository insti-
tutions. This act provided that the first $2 mil-
lion of reservable liabilities were exempt from 
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reserve requirements. The Garn-St. Germain 
Act also gave increased powers to the savings 
and loan industry. It empowered S&Ls to offer 
demand deposits to clients with existing busi-
ness relationships, to increase their holdings of 
consumer loans to 30 percent, and to increase 
their percentage of commercial loans to 55 per-
cent of total assets. (Bareham, "No Natural 
Separation," p. 21) 
There has also been extensive pressure to 
repeal the McFadden Act of 1927 and allow 
unlimited interstate branching. Critics state 
that these restrictions create banks which are 
too small to enjoy the economies of scale expe-
rienced by large foreign institutions. 
Furthermore, branching restrictions can pro-
duce de facto monopolies for banks in rural 
areas. Branching restrictions also limit the 
potential deposit base for banks and increase 
the likelihood of insolvency and failure. 
(Guttmann, p. 159) 
Similar criticisms have been leveled at the 
Glass-Steagal Act and its functional prohibi-
tions. Over the past fifteen years, bank prof-
itability has been hindered by an inability to 
diversify because regulations have limited the 
range of assets and services which banks may 
offer. Another rationale for deregulation is the 
lack of a clear distinction between classically 
defined money, whose growth the central bank 
should rigorously control, and credit, which is 
supposed to be determined by the market. 
(Kaufman, p. 147) Finally, there is already sig-
nificant de facto deregulation of the functional 
barriers established between commercial and 
investment banks. Investment banks now offer 
cash management accounts and money market 
funds which mimic the demand deposits of 
banks. Commercial banks have also blurred the 
distinction by offering limited underwriting, 
insurance coverage, and discount brokerage 
services. (Guttmann, p. 137) 
The federal deposit insurance system has 
not escaped the furor over regulation. In 1991, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA) was passed. This 
act greatly expanded the regulatory and insur-
ance powers of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation by including the troubled thrift 
industry in its domain. It also enabled the FDIC 
to borrow up to $30 billion from the U.S. 
Treasury. It gave the FDIC increased flexibility 
in establishing insurance premiums for mem-
ber institutions. Finally, FDICIA established 
minimum institutional capital levels which 
would trigger specific, permanent, corrective 
actions by federal banking agencies. (FDIC, 
1991, p. 36) 
There are opponents to this increase in 
FDIC powers. Opponents charge that the cur-
rent system of deposit insurance encourages a 
moral hazard problem for member banks. They 
assert that banks close to insolvency are 
encouraged to assume greater risks because fed-
eral insurance absolves banks from any direct 
liability to their customers. Partly to address 
this problem, in 1991 Congress imposed addi-
tional restrictions on the use by the FDIC of the 
controversial "too big to fail" policy. This pol-
icy stated that the failure to protect large insti-
tutions from failure would damage the entire 
banking system, so the FDIC assumed all loss-
es incurred by the insolvent institution. (FDIC, 
1991, p. 37) This policy created de facto full 
coverage to all liability holders of large banks. 
Given the FDIC's current financial deficit, it was 
doubtful that this policy could have been imple-
mented in a large-scale financial crisis. 
Proposed limitations on FDIC powers have 
ranged from the abolishment of deposit insur-
ance, to limiting its coverage to smaller 
amounts, to the preservation of the current sys-
tem provided that mechanisms are introduced 
to reduce risk taking incentives and enhance 
regulatory oversight. (Klausner, p. 8) 
Canada 
The Canadian commercial banking system 
has undergone radical restructuring during the 
1980s. This process has led to the dissolution 
of the four pillars system. 
This explosive deregulation has at its roots 
the ongoing power struggle between provincial 
and federal authorities. The struggle began in 
1987, when Quebec, in an effort to assume the 
role of Canada's financial center and financial 
innovator, removed the majority of restrictions 
on its financial services industry. Ontario soon 
followed suit in an effort to "ensure that our 
financial markets are so structured that Toronto 
will be able to maintain its rightful place, not 
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only as the center of Canada's capital markets, 
but as a major international financial center." 
(Jordan, p. 11) The federal government in 
Ottawa jumped into the fray with a policy paper 
proposing the toppling of the four pillars. The 
goal of these proposals was to "remove unnec-
essary regulatory barriers and allow common 
ownership of firms from the four traditional pil-
lars, while retaining separate institutions for 
supervisory purposes." (Jordan, p. 11) 
Legislation to make the proposed reforms 
law followed swiftly in 1987. As Jordan has stat-
ed, "Federal financial institutions were permit-
ted to own more than ten percent of any class 
of shares of a Canadian corporation dealing, 
directly or indirectly, in securities, including 
portfolio management and investment coun-
seling." (Jordan, p. 16) Such purchases are sub-
ject to the approval of the Minister of Finance. 
Trust, loan, and insurance companies were 
granted full consumer lending powers and full 
commercial lending powers, provided they 
maintain $25 million in capital. (Cozzati, p. 7) 
In response to these new powers, a new central 
federal agency was created. The Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions was 
given the power to supervise banks and feder-
ally chartered trust, loan, and insurance com-
panies. It also oversees the securities dealings 
undertaken by these institutions. (Jordan, p. 15) 
The Canadian Deposit Insurance Corpor-
ation remained substantially unchanged. The 
CDIC's authority was expanded in establishing 
discretion for the issuance of deposit insurance 
coverage. The CDIC also took concrete measures 
to initiate a process for termination of coverage. 
In examining the current regulatory envi-
ronment, it is necessary to examine one more 
facet of the U.S.-Canadian relationship: the cur-
rent status of commercial banking under 
NAFTA. The North American Free Trade 
Agreement sets forth provisions for the creation 
of a unified trading environment for the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico. This agreement 
encompasses all the major provisions from the 
Free Trade Agreement negotiated between the 
United States and Canada in 1988. It specifi-
cally sets forth rules for the interaction of the 
commercial banking industries of the United 
States and Canada. This agreement is not 
designed to achieve uniformity in regulation. 
Instead, it seeks to secure freedom of entry 
while preserving the regulatory prerogatives of 
the host country. (Laub, p. 28) Accordingly, the 
United States has agreed that all domestic and 
Canadian chartered banks in the United States 
will be permitted to underwrite and deal in 
securities backed by the Canadian government. 
Furthermore, the United States has agreed not 
to invoke federal laws to prevent Canadian 
banks from operating in more than one state. 
Canada has provided that the United States will 
be exempt from foreign ownership provisions. 
Canada also promises it will not abuse its con-
trol over entry provisions for the commercial 
banking industry. (Laub, p. 28) 
Given the drastically different paths the 
commercial banking systems of the United 
States and Canada have followed in the process 
of deregulation, a comparison of commercial 
bank performance during this time period pro-
vides unique insights into the relative success 
of each system's evolution. 
Performance 
The commercial banking systems of the 
United States and Canada possess drastic dif-
ferences in both structure and regulatory envi-
ronment. These differences provide a unique 
opportunity to evaluate the comparative per-
formance of the two banking systems. Such a 
comparison cannot be perfect, due to inherent 
differences between the two countries. 
However, similarities in population demo-
graphics, macro economic performance, and 
commercial bank holdings and strategies make 
a comparative evaluation more than useful. 
United States 
According to Wallich, "It has been said 
that the United States has some of the world's 
best banks and the world's worst banking sys-
tem." (Wallich, p. 152) The commercial bank-
ing system of the United States is not the world 
power it once was. Poor profitability, lagging 
innovation, and rapidly increasing insolvencies 
have shown the clear weaknesses in the 
American banking system. 
The performance of American commercial 
banks during the 1980s was substandard both 
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in profitability and global competitiveness. 
Between 1982 and 1990 the number of com-
mercial banks in the United States declined in 
seven of the nine years. The net change during 
this period was a decline of nearly 3,000 banks. 
(FDIC,1990,p.~FDIC, 1984,p.~FDIC,1983, 
p. 6) In 1993 there was only one bank out of 
the estimated 13,000 commercial banks in the 
United States whose debt was worthy of Moody's 
Aaa highest debt rating. (White, p. 21) 
One dramatic reason for this decline has 
been the rash of bank failures and insolvencies. 
In 1988, 200 banks failed. These banks pos-
sessed over $54 billion in assets. (FDIC Annual 
Report, 1989, p. viii) The number of bank clo-
sures declined slightly over the next three years, 
although the assets of failed banks rose. In 
1991, the number of insolvent banks declined 
to 127, although the assets of these banks were 
a record $63.2 billion. (FDIC Annual Report, 
1991, p. 1) Of equal importance is the number 
of problem banks recognized by the Fed. The 
number of banks classified as problem banks 
reached an all time high of 1,624 in mid-1987. 
(FDIC Annual Report, 1989, p. ix) This num-
ber declined to 1,090 banks in 1991 with assets 
of over $609 billion. (FDIC Annual Report, 
1991, p. 15) The failures ofthe American bank-
ing system in the 1980s were unparalleled. 
According to Calormiris, "The losses per deposit 
dollars due to bank and thrift failure in the last 
decade dwarf the losses of failed banks in the 
1930s." (Calormiris, p. 20) 
There are several reasons for this rash of 
bank failures. The most important of these is 
the extreme competition from non-bank inter-
mediaries and from securities markets at home 
and abroad. This competition has forced 
American commercial banks to take greater 
risks in an effort to offer competitive returns to 
consumers. In the decade from 1980 to 1990, 
bank portfolios reflected this change. Holdings 
of cash and investment -grade securities declined 
from 36 to 27 percent of assets. During the 
same period, the percentage of riskier loan hold-
ings rose from 54 to 61 percent. (White, p. 21) 
American banks have taken extreme loan 
losses during the 1980s. By investing almost 
solely in the volatile real estate and energy mar-
kets, many banks made themselves vulnerable 
to the downturns which occurred in these mar-
kets during the late 1980s. Real estate loans 
increased from 15 to 23 percent of assets dur-
ing this period. Especially hard hit were the 
Southwest and Northeast regions of the coun-
try. (White, p. 21) 
A final cause was the lack of diversification 
due to regulatory prohibitions. Many banks suf-
fered financial difficulties because they were 
unable to diversify their portfolios to reduce 
risk. Their inability took two forms. Banks 
were restricted geographically by the McFadden 
Act. This prevented banks from having access 
to a wider range of deposits which would be less 
affected by a regional economic downturn. 
Banks have also been restricted in the form of 
assets they may hold by the Glass-Steagal Act. 
This act has prevented diversification through 
holding a wide range of assets, therefore 
increasing the potential damage from declines 
in demand for certain financial instruments. 
A final symptom of the weakened 
American banking system is the uncertain sta-
tus of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. The bank failures of the 1980s 
have strained the resources of the FDIC. By 
instituting its "too big to fail" policy the FDIC 
overreached its capabilities. In 1987 the FDIC 
reached its peak level of funding with $18 bil-
lion in available reserves. By 1991 emergency 
funding was needed to keep the FDIC in sol-
vency. The FDIC's ratio of insurance funds to 
insured deposits also tumbled during the 1980s 
from 1.16% in 1980 to .60% in 1990. (Salsman, 
p. 1 07) It is estimated that in a severe reces-
sion the cost of bailing out insolvent banks 
would exceed the current funding of the FDIC 
and the Bank Insurance Fund, and render both 
agencies bankrupt. 
The prognosis for commercial banking in 
the United States is not all dismal. The declin-
ing interest rates of the early 1990s have pro-
vided a favorable environment for bank prof-
itability. These lower rates make borrowing a 
more viable option for the American public, giv-
ing banks the opportunity to create profits on 
these loans. 
Canada 
While the 1980s were not a financial dis-
aster for Canadian banks, they were hardly the 
64 
best of times. The most important events of 
this period occurred in 1985 with the failure of 
the Northland Bank and the Canadian 
Commercial Bank, two Alberta-based banks 
with assets representing less than one percent 
of the total assets of the Canadian banking sys-
tem. (Bareham, "The Contemporary Banking 
Scenes," p. 11) While the failure of two rela-
tively small regional Schedule I banks seems 
minor, these failures were the first in Canada 
since 1923. The financial difficulty faced by 
these institutions was a result of overreliance 
on Alberta's real estate and oil boom. When the 
market turned sour, the banks collapsed with 
over $1.5 billion in losses. During this period, 
a bailout attempt was organized, not by the 
Bank of Canada, but by the five largest banking 
institutions. The effort was undertaken to pre-
serve consumer confidence in the banking sys-
tem and, in particular, Schedule I banks. 
Despite these efforts, the two institutions 
became insolvent on September 1, 1985, at a 
cost of $1.8 billion to the Bank of Canada. (Bank 
of Canada Annual Report, p. 11) 
Bank income in Canada during the 1980s 
has been relatively stable. From 1983-1988, 
domestic bank profits increased from $1.3 bil-
lion to $3.3 billion. (The Canadian Bankers' 
Association, p. 16) This profitability may be 
deceiving, however. During the same period 
Canadian banks engaged in "voluntary" down-
sizing and rationalization. From 1979-1986, 
the total number of bank branches in Canada 
declined by 6.5 percent. (Bareham, "The 
Contemporary Banking Scenes," p. 11) This 
contraction is the result of mergers and liqui-
dations in banks not able to remain competi-
tive in the current deregulated market. 
The ability of Cancdian banks to survive 
the turbulent economic conditions of the 1980s 
is a testament to the regulatory environment of 
Canada. Canadian banks are better able to 
diversify their asset holdings due to deregulat-
ed commercial banking markets. Without 
branching restrictions, Canadian banks are able 
to attract a national representation of asset 
holdings, thereby reducing the risks of region-
al recessions. With the collapse of the four pil-
lar system, Canadian banks are no longer 
exposed to risks stemming from a limited range 
of product offerings. In seventy years, only two 
Canadian banks have failed. These collapses 
were the result of failures to take advantage of 
the functional and geographic diversification 
possibilities allowed by the Canadian banking 
system. 
Conclusion 
The banking systems of the United States 
and Canada have been in existence for nearly 
200 years. During this time both systems have 
undergone considerable growth and evolution. 
Although certain thematic similarities can be 
seen in the history of both banking systems, the 
process of growth for each banking system has 
been as unique as the countries they represent. 
In response to the worldwide financial 
trauma of the Great Depression, both the United 
States and Canada sought to regulate their com-
mercial banking industries. The United States 
took a strict stance on regulation, imposing 
restrictions on both the ability to branch and 
the ability to offer certain services. Canada took 
a less restrictive view of regulation, creating the 
four pillars system which imposed function 
restrictions on financial institutions. 
The drastic economic changes of the late 
1970s and early 1980s made it clear that the 
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commercial banking systems of the United 
States and Canada had to undergo extensive 
change to remain competitive. This process of 
deregulation has occurred in a piecemeal fash-
ion in the United States, as banks are gradual-
ly allowed more freedom but remain in the 
restrictive environment of structural and func-
tional restrictions. Canada has taken a more 
aggressive approach by dissolving the four pil-
lars system and allowing Canadian financial 
institutions to interact as they please. 
These two approaches have affected the 
performance of commercial banks in the United 
States and Canada. The American banking sys-
tem has struggled throughout the 1980s, 
enduring a rash of bank insolvencies and over-
all poor bank profitability. Canada's banks, 
while not tremendously successful, have main-
tained their stable existence and reasonable 
profitability throughout the turbulent 1980s. 
As both countries move forward towards 
the 21st century, the banking systems of the 
United States and Canada will be forced to suc-
ceed in a world of intense global competition 
and swift technological change. At this junc-
ture, it appears the liberalized system of 
Canadian banking is better prepared to do so. 
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